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FINDING A FEDERAL FORUM: Using the
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act
to Circumvent Federal
Abstention Doctrines
Sally S. Spector*

The number of homeless' people in the United States has
reached an unprecedented high.2 Homelessness is a national problem, and every major city in the United States has a significant
* The author is a student at the University of Minnesota Law School. She
will receive her J.D. in May 1989.
1. Legal articles dealing with issues of homelessness tend to use one of two basic definitions. The less popular approach treats homelessness as an issue of sociological alienation-thus defining homelessness as "a condition of detachment from
society characterized by the absence or attenuation of the affiliative bonds that link
settled persons to a network of interconnected social structures." Howard Bahr,
Skid Row, An Introduction to Disaffiliation 17 (1973) [hereinafter Skid Row] (citing
Larry Van Gelder, The Bowery: Tragedy in the Rain, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 15,
1966, at 29). The more prevalent approach defines homelessness in terms of lack of
residence. See, e.g., Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 11302(a) (West Supp. 1988); Linda Dakin, Homelessness: The Role of The Legal
Profession In Finding Solutions Through Litigation, 21 Fain. L.Q. 93, 96 (1987);
Note, Building a House of Legal Rights: A Pleafor the Homeless, 59 St. John's L.
Rev. 530, 530 (1985); Nancy K. Kaufmann, Homelessness: A Comprehensive Policy
Approach, 17 Urb. & Soc. Change Rev. 21 (1984); Community Service Society of
New York, Private Lives/Public Spaces: Homeless Adults on the Streets of New
York City 6-7 (1981) [hereinafter Private Lives/Public Spaces. This article adopts
the lack of residence definition and, therefore, the term homeless as used herein
should be considered to mean those individuals "whose primary nighttime residence is either in the publicly or privately operated shelters or in the streets, in
doorways, train stations and bus terminals, public plazas and parks, subways, abandoned buildings, loading docks and other well-hidden sites known only to their
users." Id.

2. House Comm. On Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, H. Rep. No. 100-10(I),
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 362,
362-63 [hereinafter H. Rep. No. 100-10(I)]. This report estimates that there are approximately three million homeless individuals in the United States today. Id.
That figure is based upon data accumulated from a series of hearings held between
1982 and 1987 by the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development to investigate the plight of the homeless. Id. In adopting the three million
figure, the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs specifically
rejected the findings of a Housing and Urban Development Report which estimated
the number of homeless in America to be between 250,000 and 350,00. Id. See Office of Policy Development and Research, Department of Housing and Urban Development, A Report to the Secretary on the Homeless and Emergency Shelters 19
(April 23, 1984).
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number of homeless individuals, ranging in estimates from four to
sixty thousand. 3 The state institutions created to aid the homeless
in their search for shelter have failed to provide any effective,
broad-reaching, short-term relief.4 The legislative and executive
branches of both federals and state government bear the burden of
ameliorating the problem. Because homelessness presents constitutional questions 6 that affect our social existence, the judiciary,
particularly the federal judiciary, must also confront the issue of
homelessness.7
State court attempts to resolve the problems facing the home3. James Langdon II & Mark Kass, Homelessness in America"Looking for the
Right to Shelter, 19 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 305, 310 n.27 (1985) (citing Mario
Cuomo, 1933/1983-Never Again: A Report to the National Governors' Association
Task Force on the Homeless, July 1983, at 16). See also Homelessness in a Modern
Urban Setting, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 749, 749 n.3-4 (1982); Private Lives/Public
Spaces, supra note 1, at 8-9.
4. See generally Langdon & Kass, supra note 3, at 314-19. The few cities that
do provide municipal shelters for the homeless only offer nighttime, dormitorytype shelter, characterized by overcrowding and violent conditions. Id. at 317. A
primary factor in the dangerous conditions of municipal shelters is the vast number
of mentally ill who make up the homeless population. See infra notes 18-21 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the mentally-ill homeless population.
5. The federal legislative response to homelessness, the enactment of the
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482
(1987) (codified in scattered sections of titles 7, 20, 29, 40 and 42 U.S.C.A. (West
Supp. 1988)), is discussed infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
6. Though the Supreme Court decided in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), that there is no constitutional right to subsistence, application of various
state laws to issues of homelessness presents equal protection and due process questions. See, e.g., Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol, 674 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (equal
protection claim); Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.) (equal protection
claim), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2nd Cir. 1985).
There is considerable confusion as to the correct spelling of the first plaintiff's
name in the Canaday case. On the first page of the district court opinion, the name
appears as "Canaday." See 608 F. Supp. at 1460. The running header given by the
publisher to designate this case spells the name as "Canady." See, e.g., 608 F. Supp.
at 1461. On the first page of the circuit court opinion, the name is spelled "Cannady." See 768 F.2d at 501. For purposes of this article, the spellings used on the
first pages of the opinions will be used despite the inconsistent result.
7. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1979).
Professor Fisk advances the theory that the Constitution establishes the structure
of government, and also identifies the values that will inform and limit that structure. He writes:
All of us, both as individuals and institutional actors, play a role in
[the process of giving constitutional values specific meaning and priority.] In modern society, where the state is all-pervasive, these values
determine the quality of our social existence-they truly belong to the
public-and as a consequence, the range of voices that give meaning to
these values is as broad as the public itself.... Judges have no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to the public values of the Constitution, but neither is there reason for them to be silent. They too can
make a contribution to the public debate and inquiry.
Id. The federal judiciary not only can, but must make a contribution to the public
concern over the homeless. The causes of homelessness put each and every one of

1988]

FINDING A FEDERAL FORUM

less,S while laudatory in their efforts, have nevertheless resulted
in piecemeal resolutions of the issues.9 A judicial forum is needed
which not only can decide conclusively the constitutional issues
presented by the homeless, but also can implement solutions to
those problems. The federal courts should be that forum. The
federal judiciary has demonstrated that it has the ability to grant
relief which affects, and may even restructure, state institutions so
that the homeless could receive the full benefit of state and federal laws.10 Up until this time, however, the federal courts have
been unable or unwilling to provide a federal forum to adjudicate
issues of homelessness. This inaction is due in part to federal abstention doctrines.11 The existing abstention doctrines allow federal courts to abstain from deciding cases which otherwise fulfill
us at substantial risk of someday joining the ranks of the homeless. See infra notes
24-40 and accompanying text.
8. While the primary difficulty facing the homeless is the lack of permanent
shelter, the state of being homeless produces other problems. Inability to find employment because of the lack of a permanent address, a higher incidence of disease
because of an inability to gain access to laundry and washing facilities, and difficulty in obtaining public assistance are just a few examples of the kind of subsidiary problems homelessness produces. See generally H. Rep. No. 100-10(I), supra
note 2, at 365.
9. See, e.g., Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979). In Callahan,Justice Andrew A. Tyler granted a motion for preliminary
injunction brought by homeless men against the City of New York. The men
sought an order requiring the City to provide and open shelters that furnish lodging and meals to all homeless men who apply. Justice Tyler held that, under the
New York State Constitution and various provisions of New York state law, the
men were entitled to board and lodging. Id.
The decision in Callahan, however, did not settle the question of the right to
shelter for the remainder of New York's homeless population. Nine more years
and two additional lawsuits were required to determine that the same right exists
in New York for homeless women and homeless families. See Eldredge v. Koch,
118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct.) (women), rev'd on other grounds, 98
A.D.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1983); McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511
N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987) (families).
10. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.) (federal administration of state mental hospital based on constitutional right to minimum level of
medical treatment), hearings on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub noma. and remanded, Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (supervision
and administration of state prison based on eighth amendment rights), aff'd and
remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. after remand and remanded, Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd
sub nom after remand, Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S.
678 (1978).
Admittedly, the subsequent case histories of the above decisions indicate that
implementation of federal judicial solutions to complex state social problems may
require the extensive use of federal judicial resources. Nevertheless, the author believes that this is appropriate when a compelling social problem, such as homelessness, continues to exist.
11. See, e.g., Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Canaday v.
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federal subject matter jurisdiction requirements if ambiguous or
uncertain issues of state law are present with the federal claims.12
The recent passage of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Asssitance Act' 3 ["Act"] may have created a vehicle whereby federal courts could enforce the rights of the homeless.
This Article will explore how the legal community may use
the Act to adjudicate issues of homelessness in the federal forum.
Section I examines the basic causes of homelessness and the recently enacted federal legislation designed to alleviate the problem. Section II discusses the leading abstention doctrines used in
the federal courts. Section III explores how the Act may be used
to circumvent the federal abstention doctrines and to help in providing a federal forum for the homeless. Finally, Section IV concludes that federal courts should fulfill the intent of Congress and
use the federal forum to adjudicate the rights of the homeless.
I.

The Homeless and the Legislation Enacted to Help Them

The problems facing the homeless, and the purposes underlying the Act, truly can be understood only by examining the individuals who make up the homeless population.

A.

Homelessness and Its Causes

Perceptions are changing regarding the identity of the individuals who make up the homeless population. The stereotype of
the homeless as a group of white, alcoholic, middle-aged men, confined to discrete areas of major cities, such as "skid rows," no
longer holds true.1 4 Rather, the faces of homelessness, and the areas where those faces appear, have undergone a major transition
in the last ten to fifteen years.15 Today the population of homeless
men in any major city is more likely to consist of minorities below
Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d
501 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. For a discussion of the three abstention doctrines most commonly invoked
to avoid deciding issues of homelessness, see infra notes 64-81, 99-108, 121-32 and
accompanying text.
13. The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101
Stat. 482 (1987) (codified in scattered section of titles 7, 20, 29, 40 and 42 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1988)). Originally titled the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act, the
Act was renamed the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act "in honor of
the dedication and work in support of homeless and disadvantaged persons put
forth by Representative McKinney (R. Connecticut) who died on May 7, 1987."
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-174, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 362, 441.
14. Langdon & Kass, supra note 4, at 308 n. 20. For a discussion of the disappearence of the skid row neighborhood, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
15. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, at B4, col. 3.
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the age of forty.16 Women and families of all races represent an
17
ever-increasing percentage of the homeless population.
Additionally, the homeless population as a whole contains a
disproportionate number of mentally ill or mentally handicapped
persons.' 8 Although many of the homeless represent a portion of
the deinstitutionalized psychiatric care community, 19 the number
of homeless who currently manifest psychological difficulties exceeds the number of homeless deinstitutionalized mental patients. 20 Members of the homeless population undeniably suffer
from pyschological disorders at a rate which far exceeds the rest of
the population.21 Thus, whatever the sex, race, or age of the
homeless individual, life on the streets is more than a physically
taxing existence; it is a mentally harrowing experience.
Knowing who the individuals are that make up the homeless
population is only the first step in understanding the problem of
homelessness. To comprehend why this population has experienced such unprecedented growth, 22 one must also examine the
causes of homelessness. Two major factors have been identified as
causes of homelessness: decreases in funding to social services; and
high unemployment rates, particularly in the sub-groups that
23
make up the homeless population.
16. See, e.g., Langdon & Kass, supra note 3, at 308 n.21 (citing Human Resources Admin. of the City of New York, Correlates of Shelter Utilization: One Day
Study (August 1984)).
17. Dakin, supra note 1, at 100. The presence of women and families as plaintiffs in litigation involving the homeless is perhaps the most telling indication of
their increase as sub-units of the United States' homeless population. See, e.g.,
Slade v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (class of homeless pregnant women
and children); Lamboy v. Gross, 126 A.D.2d 265, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 1987)
(homeless family); Hansen v. Department of Social Servs., 193 Cal. App. 3d 283, 238
Cal. Rptr. 232 (Ct. App. 1987) (homeless families); Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d
163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct.) (homeless women), rev'd on other grounds 98
A.D.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (App. Div. 1983).
18. See generally A. Anthony Arce, A PsychiatricProfile of Street People Admitted to an Emergency Shelter, 34 Hosp. Community Psychiatry 812 (1983).
19. For a discussion of deinstitutionalization, see iqfra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
20. Dakin, supra note 1, at 99-100.
21. The omnipresent physical dangers under which the homeless must carry on
their day-to-day lives is but one of the possible underlying causes of the psychological disorders evident in the homeless population. Publicly funded shelters are
often overcrowded and unsafe. See generally Langdon & Kass, supra note 3, at 31417. Frequently, the homeless sleep during the day and move about at night rather
than face the horrors of the public shelter system. Id.
22. For a discussion of the most recent statistics on the homeless which indicate
an increase in the overall number of homeless individuals in the United States, see
supra note 2.
23. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the subgroups which make up the homeless population.
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The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs has identified the decrease in federal, state and local social
service funding as one of the major causes of homelessness in the
United States.24 This decrease in funding has been concentrated in
three areas: reduction of financial support for psychiatric care facilities, with resulting deinstitutionalization; drastically lowered
public housing assistance; and more stringent requirements for receiving general assistance. The reduction of funding in all three
areas has contributed to an ever-increasing homeless population.
With the introduction of new psychotropic drugs in the mid1950s 2 5 mental hospitals began to discharge their patients en masse
into society at large. This phenomenon has become known as
deinstitutionalization. 26 While deinstitutionalization was motivated in part by liberty concerns, 27 fiscally conservative proponents of the process hailed it as a less expensive way to deal with
the problems of the mentally ill.28 In support of their position,
proponents advocated the creation of numerous community-based
care facilities. 29 These facilities, and the funds necessary to deal
with the deinstitutionalized patients, never materialized.3 0 Despite
this, deinstitutionalization has continued, along with the implementation of restrictive admission policies to state psychiatric care
facilities. As a result, a significant number of the homeless who
are mentally ill receive no medical supervision or care. 31 Hence,
24. See H. Rep. No. 100-10(I), supra note 2, at 18-19.
25. For a discussion of the increased availability and the increased use of
psychotropic drugs, see Henry Brill & Robert E. Patton, Analysis of PopulationReduction in New York State Mental Hospitals During First Four Years of LargeScale Therapy with PsychotropicDrugs, 116 Am. J. Psychiatry 495 (1959).
26. Peter Marcuse, Neutralizing Homelessness, Socialist Rev., Jan. 1988, at 69,
89.
27. See, e.g., Richard Rapson, The Right of The Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 193, 200-02 (1980) (noting the
judicial factors behind the trend to deinstitutionalize); Robert W. Collin & Daniel
J. Barry, Homelessness: A Post-IndustrialSociety Faces a Legislative Dilemma, 20
Akron L. Rev. 409, 411 n.14 (1987).
28. See Rapson, supra note 27, at 200-02; Collin & Barry, supra note 27, at 411
n.14.
29. Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Financeand UrbanAffairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 43 (1982) (Statement of Kim Hooper and Ellen Baxter, National Coalition for the Homeless, Community Service Society of New
York).
30. The failure of community-based care facilities to materialize was caused, in
part, by community resistance to the placement of the facilities. Id. See also H.
Rep. No. 101-10(I), supra note 2, at 365 (stating that "The Community Mental
deinstitutionalized people, but the
Health Program was established to assist ...
Gramm-Latta Budget Amendments enacted in 1981 prevented the funding of this
program.").
31. See Dakin, supra note 1, at 104-05.
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the majority of the mentally ill homeless are not receiving the
medication necessary to make their lives outside the institution a
tenable reality.32

The decrease of funds in public housing assistance has also
fueled the increase of homeless individuals and families. Federal
housing assistance has decreased 70 percent since 1982.33 Moreover, urban gentrification 34 has reduced the already small supply
of existing low-cost housing.3 5 The classic "skid row" hotels have
disappeared, and areas which once provided adequate low-cost
3
shelter have been redeveloped into profitable high-rent districts.

6

The combined effect of disappearing low-cost housing, and a lack
of funding to supply replacement units has created a new class of
37
displaced persons in the United States.
Cutbacks in state and federal general assistance programs
have also contributed to the increasing homeless population. The
38
and has enfederal government has reduced disability benefits,

acted stricter review and eligibility requirements.3 9 As a result,
fewer people qualify for general assistance, and the amount distributed to those eligible has been reduced.
Decreased funding is not the sole factor causing the increasing number of homeless. Unemployment also has contributed to
the problem. While national unemployment rates have decreased
over the past several years, employment rates for women and minorities, two groups highly represented among the homeless, have
40
remained stagnant or decreased.
32. The unmedicated mentally ill, in addition to their attempt to function dayto-day, also must face the bureaucratic rigors of the social services system. The
complexities of these systems are often enough to unnerve even those not suffering
from mental impairments. As a result, there presumably are mentally ill homeless
individuals who are entitled to benefits but cannot surmount the governmental system to receive them. Id.
33. H. Rep. No. 101-10(I), supra note 2, at 18.
34. "Gentrification involves the displacement of lower income groups by those
of higher income in older housing, generally near city centers... [and] includes the
conversion of.. . 'slum areas' to 'higher and better uses.' This translates to mean
the displacement by the better off of poor people, often onto the streets." Marcuse,
supra note 26, at 74.
35. Langdon & Kass, supra note 3, at 311 n. 33-35.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Chester Hartman, Dennis Keating, & Richard Legates, Displacement: How to Fight It 3 (1982).
38. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat.
2599 (1980).
39. Collin & Barry, supra note 27, at 413-14.
40. From 1978 until August 1987 the overall national employment rate has fluctuated between a low of 5.8% in 1979 and a high of 10.2% in 1983. The current, national unemployment rate is 6%. The unemployment rate for white males has
never risen above 8.6% and is currently at 5.1%. The unemployment rate for
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The cumulative effect of these factors is that an ever increasing percentage of the United States population has become vulnerable to homelessness. In 1987 Congress recognized that without
some kind of comprehensive federal policy, homelessness would
continue to escalate. In response, Congress enacted the Stewart B.
4
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. 1
B.

The Federal Legislation

The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act represents a bipartisan, emergency effort on behalf of the House and
43
the Senate 42 to address the pressing problem of homelessness.
The Act, by allocating $500 million in emergency funds, represents
the Congressional commitment "to save lives, [and] to provide
emergency shelter and health care services to people whose lives
are endangered." 44 The purpose of the Act is to provide funds to
assist the homeless and "to use public resources and programs in a
more coordinated manner to meet the critically urgent needs of
5
the homeless."4
The Act contains eight substantive titles,46 each designed to

deal with a specific issue of homelessness. Recognizing that the
Blacks and Hispanics, however, has never been less than 10.4% and is currently at
12.4%. U.S. Dep't of Labor Statistics, Monthly Lab. Rev., Dec. 1980, at 80; Dec. 1983,
at 67; Oct. 1987, at 67.
41. Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of titles 7, 20, 29, 40 and 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1988)).
42. H.R. 558, the bill drafted by the House to deal with the problem of homelessness was passed in lieu of S. 782, 809, 811 and 813. H. Rep. No. 101-10(I), supra
note 2, at 362.
The Act grew out of the investigation into homelessness conducted by the
House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development from 1982 through
1987. Id.
43. Id. at 20.
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1130(b) (West Supp. 1988).
46. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Publ. L. No. 100-77, 101
Stat. 482 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of titles 7, 20, 29, 40 and 42 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1988)). The eight provisions are: creation of an interagency council on
the homeless (Title II, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11311-11319); creation of the federal emergency management food and shelter program (Title III, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11331-11352);
allocation of funding for housing assistance (Title IV, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5302, 1136111401); provisions for use of surplus federal property (Title V, 40 U.S.C.A.
§ 484(j)(3)(8); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11411-11412); Funding for health care for the homeless
3
(Title VI, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 254e(2)( ), 256, 290aa-3, 290bb-12(c), 290bb-2(b), 290cc-21 to
290cc-36, 290dd to 290dd-3, 290ee to 290ee-3); establishment of education, training
and community service programs for the homeless (Title VII, 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1205(b), 1207(a); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503(8)(b), 1551(e); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11421-11472);
food assistance for the homeless (Title VIII, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 612(e) 2012(i), 2012(s),
2014(c), 2014(e), 2014(k)(2), 2020(e)(1), 2025(a), 2025(e)(9)); and an extension of the
veterans Job Training Act (Title IX, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1721).
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homeless population is divided into sub-groups with differing
needs, 47 Congress created a legislative provision to reach each
branch of this population. Although structured as an emergency
measure, the Act makes certain substantive changes in existing
law48 which will continue to impact the lives of the homeless beyond the termination of the stated dates of relief.49 Thus, by going
beyond the enactment of merely temporary measures, the Act differs from prior Congressional appropriations designed to aid the
homeless. 50 In addition, Congress may have created a road which
previously had been blocked by abstention doctrines.

II. The Impact of the Major Abstention Doctrines on Litigation
Efforts by the Homeless in Federal Courts
In Cohens v. Virginia,51 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution....

With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a

case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The
52
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, federal courts unflaggingly obeyed Marshall's command that a federal court has
"no.. .right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given."5 3
47. See generally H. Rep. No. 101-10(I), supra note 2, at 362-63. See also supra
notes 15-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the homeless population.
48. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-77, §§ 601-603, 101 Stat. 482, 511-15 (1987) (amending Subchapter II of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 242n to 280b-3
(1982) to provide specific funding for health care services for the homeless) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 254 e(a)(3), 256, 110301 (West Supp. 1988)); Pub.
L. No. 100-77, §§ 801-809, 101 Stat. 482, 533-536 (1987) (amending § 3 of the Food
Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1982) to specifically include homeless individuals within the group of eligible food stamp recipients) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C.A. 612(c), 2012(i), 2012(s), 2014(c) 2014(e), 2014(k)(2), 2020(e)(1), 2025(a),
2025(e)(9) (West Supp. 1988).
49. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of how existing law is changed.
50. See, e.g., Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, 98
Stat. 1369, 1382-83 (1984) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency
Food and Shelter Program); Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181,
97 Stat. 1153, 1154-55 (1983) (Emergency Food Distribution and Shelter Program);
Continuing Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 974-75 (1983) (Food Distribution
and Emergecy Shelter); Emergency Job Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 98-8. 97 Stat.
13, 28 (1983).
51. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Food Distribution and Emergency Shelters).
52. Id. at 404.
53. Id. The federal courts' habitual assumption of jurisdiction of a case when
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Beginning in the middle of twentieth century, however, the
Supreme Court began to recognize the existence of certain, exceptional circumstances, which permit a federal court to abstain from
hearing and deciding cases that fall within its jurisdiction.54 One
of these judicially created doctrines, known as abstention, allows a
federal court to derogate a litigant's supposed absolute right to a
federal forum for claims involving questions governed by federal
55
subject matter jurisdiction.
All forms of abstention in the federal courts can be characterized by a common factor: the presence of ambiguous or uncertain
issues of state law.56 Over the years the Supreme Court has developed specific doctrines 5 7 to deal with unique issues of concurrent
federal subject matter jurisdiction existed was premised, in part, on the theory that
Congress conferred an absolute right to a federal forum in providing for federal
subject matter jurisdiction. David Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of
Colorado River, 59 Tulane L. Rev. 651, 653, (1985) (citing McClellan v. Carland, 217
U.S. 268, 282 (1910) (a federal court has "no authority" to abdicate its jurisdiction
because of the presence of a pending state action)).
54. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (a federal court
may dismiss a properly filed case under the doctrine of forum non conviens). The
doctrine of forum non conviens allows a federal court to exercise its discretion and
dismiss a case when another existing federal, state or foriegn court possesses the
power to hear the case, or when the case has been brought in an inconvenient forum without good reason. In addition, dismissal is proper when various considerations of public policy demand a change of forum. See generally Edward L. Barret,
Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conviens, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380 (1947). The doctrine of forum non conviens has been replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
55. Sonenshein, supra note 53, at 654. A court may use abstention to dismiss a
proceeding outright, or to stay it until resolution of the pending state action. Under
the workings of res judicata and collateral estoppel, however, a stay or dismissal
will accomplish the same purpose-"the prior and ultimate adjudication of the concurrent claims by the state ourt.. ." Id. at 671.

56. Martin Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial
Power 233 (1980). For a discussion of the three most common forms of federal abstention, see infra notes 64-81, 99-108, 121-32 and accompanying text .
57. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 426 U.S. 912
(1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1942); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1940). Younger abstention, which counsels against a federal court enjoining a pending state criminal
action absent bad faith, harrassment or prosecution under a patently invalid state
statute, is not discussed in this article. For a discussion of Younger abstention see
Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable
Relief When No State Prosecutionis Pending, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 874 (1972).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to apply Younger abstention in a case involving a protest of President Reagan's homeless policies. See Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Because Juluke was a civil action to enjoin enforcement of the regulations which
prohibited the demonstration, the Juluke court refused to apply Younger abstention. The Juluke court specified that Younger abstention was a mandatory rule
and would only be applied in a federal actions seeking to enjoin a state criminal
prosecution. Thus the potentially drastic effect of "denying a litigant a federal forum to pursue an otherwise legitimate constitutional claim" was prevented. Id. at
1556.
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jurisdiction.

58

The present abstention doctrines have served, in part, as a basis for denying a federal forum to those seeking to litigate the
rights of the homeless. 59 Those courts using the abstention doctrines to circumvent issues of homelessness, have created a precedent denying the homeless a federal forum, even when federal
questions are involved.
A.

The FederalAbstention Doctrines

To date, the federal courts have invoked three specific forms
of abstention in litigation involving the homeless: Pullman abstention,6 0 Burford abstention, 6 1 and Colorado River abstention.6 2
While each doctrine requires the existence of a specific set of circumstances to justify its use, at least two federal courts, when
faced with litigation involving the homeless, have found that the
proper factual and legal criteria calling for abstention were present.63 Accordingly, understanding both the background of each
relevant federal abstention doctrine and how that doctrine has
been applied to litigation efforts involving the homeless is necessary in order to prevent their application in the future.
1.

Pullman Abstention

In Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman,64 the Supreme
Court faced a fourteenth amendment equal protection and due
process challenge to an allegedly discriminatory order of the Texas
58. See Sonenshein, supra note 53, at 656. Professor Sonenshein states that:
[I]t may no longer be appropriate to speak of "the abstention doctrine." In fact, it appears "that it is more precise to refer to 'abstention doctrines,' since there are several distinguishable lines of cases,
involving different factual situations, different procedural consequences, different policy considerations, and different arguments for
and against their validity."
Id. (quoting 17 Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, and Edwin Cooper, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 4241, at 446 (1978)).
59. See, e.g., Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.) (Burford and Colorado River abstention), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.
1985); Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Pullman abstention).
60. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1940). For a
discussion of Pullman abstention, see infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
61. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1942). For a discussion of Burford
abstention, see infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
62. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 426 U.S. 912
(1976). For a discussion of Colorado River abstention, see infra notes 121-32 and
accompanying text.
63. See Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.) (Burford and Colorado
River abstention), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985);
Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Pullmanabstention).
64. 312 U.S. 496 (1940).
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Railroad Commission. 65 The district court had not reached the
federal issues involved, but instead decided that the applicable
67
state statute6 6 did not authorize the order.
The Supreme Court, while finding that the Pullman car porters had advanced a substantial constitutional claim, believed that
the case touched on a "sensitive area of social policy" which it
should avoid if possible.6 8 In support of its decision the Court said:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly
promoted if an unneccessary ruling of a federal court is thus
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tenative decision as well as the friction of a prema6 9
ture constitutional adjudication.

By declining to reach the constitutional question because of
an existing, unsettled question of state law, the Court established a
two-part test which was to serve as the basis for the Pullman abstention doctrine. Specifically, Pullman abstention first requires
that there be an uncertain question of state law. Second, the state
law question must be susceptible to a construction that either
would eliminate the necessity of reaching a decision on the federal
65. Id. at 497-98. The order required that all sleeping cars on trains be under
the control of a Pullman conductor. Id. At that time in Texas, conductors were
white and porters were black. Id. at 497. The Pullman Company, the Pullman conductors, and the railroads all objected to the order. Id. at 498.
66. The statute at issue provided that:
Power and authority are hereby conferred upon the Railroad Commission of Texas over all railroads, and suburban, belt and terminal railroads, and over all public wharves, docks, piers, elevators, warehouses,
sheds, tracks and other property used in connection therewith in this
State, and over all persons, associations and corporations, private or
municipal, owning or operating such railroad, wharf, dock, pier, elevator, warehouse, shed, track, or other property to fix, and it is hereby
made the duty of the said Commisssion to adopt all necessary rates,
charges and regulations, to govern and regulate such railroads, persons, associations and corporations, and to correct abuses and prevent
unjust discrimination in the rates, charges and tolls of such railroads,
persons, associations and corporations, and to fix division of rates,
charges and regulations between railroads and other utilities and common carriers where a division is proper and correct, and to prevent
any and all other abuses in the conduct of their business and to do and
perform such other duties and details in connection therewith as may
be provided by law.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6445 (Vernon 1926).
67. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498-99. The Supreme Court concluded that the language of the statute was "far from clear" and that the district court's interpretation
of the statute was based on mere speculation as to how the Texas courts would interpret their own statute. Id. at 498-500.
68. Id. at 498. The Court felt it should avoid deciding issues of racial discrimination if it could. Id. at 499-500.
69. Id. at 500.
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70
issue, or would moot the decision of the federal issue.
Pullman abstention, as the first clear authorization for the
federal courts to abdicate their given jurisdiction 7 ' was only to be
used in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. 72 Various
circuit courts of appeal, however, have altered both the test to be
used when applying Pullman abstention and the circumstances in
which it may be used.73 The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second, 74 Third,75 Ninth,76 and Tenth Circuits77 have all added
additional prongs to the original Pullman analysis. In the Fifth
Circuit, only one of three factors need be apparent for a federal
district court to abdicate its jurisdiction.78 The remaining cir-

70. Id.
71. The Court attempted to clarify the Pullman doctrine in Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964). In Baggett, the Court found that Pullman abstention is not appropriate when there is only an unclear question of state law. Id. at 375. Rather,
certain "triggering" circumstances must exist. Id. at 375. Those special circumstances, however, are essentially the same as those established by the Pullman
Court-the existence of an unclear question of state law whose construction might
moot or limit the federal question. Id. at 375-78.
72. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188
(1959) (doctrine of abstention grants extraordinary and narrow exception to duty of
district court to adjudicate controversy properly before it).
73. See generally Note, Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the Boundaries, 59
Temple L.Q. 1243 (1986) [hereinafter Pullman Abstention].
74. See McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1976). Pullman abstention can only be invoked in the Second Circuit when: (1) there is an unsettled
question of state law; (2) the federal question can be adjudicated only after an interpretation of that state law; and (3) the state law must be susceptible to an interpretation which would avoid or modify the federal constitutional issue. Id. The
Second Circuit also considers formally recognized policy considerations. The circuit
believes that Pullman abstention should only be granted when abstention will
avoid state-federal friction and when assumption of jurisdiction will require an unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues. See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d
46, 49 (2d Cir. 1978). These policy considerations reflect the Supreme Court's concern that abstention should not be harshly applied in cases involving civil rights
and first amendment issues, but are not limited specifically to those instances.
75. See, e.g., D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 685-86 (3d Cir. 1978)
(using three-part test to invoke Pullman abstention), rev'd on other grounds,
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1978). Unlike the Second Circuit,
the Third Circuit requires as the third determinative factor that it be apparent that
an erroneous determination of state law by a federal court would be disruptive to
important state policies. Id. The Third Circuit has also added an economic harm
factor to its determination. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356 (3d
Cir. 1986).
76. See, e.g., Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir.
1974) (using same three-part test as Third Circuit). The Ninth Circuit also appears
to consider whether a state law, though settled, contains unclear or complicated
procedural aspects. See Pearl Inv. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 774 F.2d
1460 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
77. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King, 655 F.2d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1981) (using threepart test used in Third and Ninth Circuits).
78. See, e.g., Stephens by Stephens v. Bowie County, 724 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir.
1984); Mireles v. Crosby County, 724 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1984); Pietzsch v. Mat-
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cults, 79 have developed tests that adhere more closely to the original Pullman standards established by the Supreme Court.8 0
Whatever the test used, Pullman abstention remains a vital
doctrine. While its motive of avoiding state-federal conflicts is
valid, its inconsistent application throughout the federal circuits is
just cause for seeking to circumvent its application. 8 X
The decision in Weiser v. Koch 82 is an example of the impact
that Pullman has on the homeless and demonstrates how the
courts have used Pullman abstention to avoid addressing issues of
homelessness. In Weiser, former and present occupants of New
York City's municipal shelter system asked the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for damages, as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief against the shelters' operators.8 3 After determining that the parties lacked standing,8 4 and
that it would not assume pendent jurisdiction,8 5 the district court

addressed abstention.
The Weiser court considered the three major abstention doctrines, and then turned specifically to Pullman abstention.8 6 The
court stated that to invoke Pullman abstention:
[Tihe state law [must] be unclear or the issue of state law
[must] be uncertain, that resolution of the federal issue [must]
depend upon the interpretation to be given to the state law,
tox, 719 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1983); High 01' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135,
139 (5th Cir. 1980). There must be either (1) a difficult or obscure question of state
law; (2) the decision of the state law question must eliminate or narrow the scope
of the federal issue; or (3) the potential must exist for state-federal friction or confusion with a state program or scheme. By requiring only one of the above factors
to be present in order to invoke Pullman abstention, the Fifth Circuit has misunderstood and broadened the doctrine far beyond the boundaries originally intended
by the Supreme Court.
79. The First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.
80. See, e.g., George v. Parratt, 602 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1979) (five-factor test);
Ubanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993, 998 (1st Cir. 1983). These
circuits tend to use a case-by-case analysis, a method suggested by the Supreme
Court. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
81. See Pullman Abstention, supra note 73, at 1262-65 for a proposal to modify
the doctrine.
82. 632 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
83. Id. at 1370-71.
84. Id. at 1373-74. The court found that the former and present shelter members lacked standing to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief based on allegations
that they were subject to eviction without due process of law. The shelter members
did not allege, nor was it likely, that they would be faced with the imminent possibility of being evicted from a municipal shelter without adequate due process protection. Id.
85. Id. at 1376-77. The Weiser court found that pendent jurisdiction should not
be exercised. The court declined jurisdiction to avoid a needless decision of state
law and to promote justice between the parties. Furthermore, it found state issues
to predominate. Id.
86. Id. at 1378-79.
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and that the state law [must] be susceptible of an interpreta87
tion that would avoid or modify the constitutional issue.

After a lengthy examination of the relevant case law,8 8 the court
concluded that the state law regarding shelter for the homeless
was "extremely unclear."8 9 Accordingly, it held that the first
prong of the Second Circuit's Pullman test, that the state law be
uncertain, was satisfied.90 Further, the court found that resolution
of the federal issues presented depended on the interpretation
given to the state law. 91 The plaintiffs would have a protectible
property interest only if the New York Constitution or a state statute created "a mutually explicit understanding that shelter would
be provided."92 The Weiser court also found that resolution of
plaintiffs' procedural due process claim required a determination
that New York law entitles the plaintiffs to shelter. 93 The court
determined that New York law was susceptible to the interpretation that no right to shelter exists, and thus a federal court finding
of a due process violation could become moot.94 Lastly, the court
stated that because the unsettled issue would soon be decided in a
case then pending in state court,95 abstention would not create
piecemeal litigation. 96 The Weiser court thus concluded that Pull87. Id. at 1379 (citing McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1976)).
88. The New York courts, state and federal, have seen the majority of the litigation involving the homeless. See, e.g., Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460
(S.D.N.Y.), qff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985);
Lamboy v. Gross, 129 Misc. 2d 564, 493 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1985); McCain v.
Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987). This is partly attributable to the concentration of the homeless population in New York City. See supra
notes 14-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the homeless population.
New York's constitution which provides specifically for aid to the needy, is also responsible for the amount of litigation in New York courts involving the provision of
housing to the homeless. See N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
89. Weiser, 632 F. Supp. at 1379. The Weiser court concluded that the cumulative effect of decisions in previous cases left unclear the question of whether a right
to shelter exists in New York. Id. at 1379-82.
90. Id. at 1379. See supra note 74 for a discussion of the Second Circuit's threepronged Pullman test.
91. Id. at 1382. This finding satisfied the second prong of the Pullman test used
by the Second Circuit. See supra note 74.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1382-83.
94. Id. at 1383. This determination of potential mootness met the third prong of
the Second Circuit's Pullman test. See supra note 74.
95. McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987). McCain, which involved the right of homeless families to shelter, was ultimately resolved in favor of the homeless. The McCain court did not reach the issue of
whether the New York State Constitution requires the state to provide shelter to
the homeless. Rather, the court found that it had the power to issue a temporary
injunction requiring New York City to provide housing that meets minimum standards for families who already had received government housing but had been
evicted. Id. at 109-10, 511 N.E.2d at 65-66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
96. Weiser, 632 F. Supp. at 1383.
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man abstention was appropriate. 97 The court, however, did not
dismiss the action outright, but instead stayed its proceedings until
resolution of the shelter issue in the state court action.9 8
2.

Burford Abstention

In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,99 the Supreme Court was confronted with a dispute involving questions of both federal and state
law. A Texas oil producer sought to enjoin the execution of an order granting a neighboring leaseholder a permit to drill new
wells.100 Unlike Pullman, Burford did not require construction of
an unclear state statute. 101 Rather, the Court was faced with a
case where the state already had extensive administrative procedures in place. Thus a decision by the Court was seen as likely to
disrupt state policy and to yield inconsistent and erroneous results. 1 02 Although the Burford Court created a new basis for
courts to abstain from exercising their given jurisdiction, it failed
to enunciate a clear standard for when such abstention is
03
appropriate.
The lower courts have been hindered by the Supreme Court's
failure to enunciate a clear standard for Burford abstention.
Across the circuits, inconsistent decisions have been issued in cases
involving, inter alia, disruption of state policies, 10 4 the supposed
availability of an exclusive state judicial remedy, 105 and the exist97. Id. at 1383-84.

98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1384, 1387.
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Id. at 317.
Texas law on the regulation of oil drilling was far from unsettled. Because

of the problems involved in allocating oil rights, the state had established a special

review system for orders of the Texas Railroad Commission, the body politic governing oil production. Id. at 325-27. The Texas state courts were given exclusive
jurisdiction to review the Commission's orders and had developed expertise in the
area of oil regulation because of the large number of disputes over Commission orders. Id.
102. Id. at 326-27.
103. The difficulties caused by the Court's failure to enunciate a clear standard
for when Burford abstention is appropriate can be seen in later Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
In Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, the Court seemed to broaden the instances where
application of Burford abstention is appropriate. The Court set a far less stringent
standard for abstention than it had in Burford and merely used the justification
that the issue was a matter of local concern. Id. at 349-50.
104. Compare Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135, (10th Cir. 1974) and
Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d 321, (5th Cir. 1973), modified per curiam, 519 F.2d 52
(5th Cir. 1975) (abstention without reference to potential disruption of state poli-

cies) with AFA Distrib. Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973) (requiring showing of potential disruption before ordering abstention).

105. Compare Kelly Servs., Inc., v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976) (error not
to have abstained in light of availability of exclusive state indicial remedy) with
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ence of enacted regulations by local governments. 0 6 This confusion may be partially attributable to the Supreme Court's failure
to consistently require the presence of a state law claim.10 7 The
inconsistencies in the application of the policy underlying Burford
allow federal judges to abstain without censure, resulting in deferral of decisions on important social issues, including homelessness. 08 Accordingly, like Pullman abstention, there is good
reason to avoid Burford abstention if possible.
Canaday v. Koch 109 illustrates the impact Burford abstention
has had on litigation efforts by the homeless. In Canaday, a group
of homeless mothers claiming to have been denied access to emergency shelter operated by the New York City Human Resources
Administration ("HRA") sought to represent "all homeless families in New York City that have been, are being, or will be denied
emergency shelter by [the HRA]."110 Plaintiffs asked the District
Court for the Southern District of New York to grant them and
members of their class declaratoryili and injunctivell2 relief. The
court, however, denied any form of the requested relief. Instead,
Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Burford abstention inappropriate because subject matter of action not highly complex or unique).
106. Compare City of Monroe v. United Gas Corp., 253 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958)
(abstaining in case of local rather than statewide regulation) with Rancho Palos
Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1976) (correct to retain jurisdiction over federal claims asserted by plaintiff pending resolution of state
issue in state court).
107. The circuits may be confused over the need for a state law claim because in
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Court refused to abstain where
the case presented no issue of state law, a decision inconsistent with a prior holding.
See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (abstention
though federal due process challenge was only claim presented).
108. See, e.g., Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
109. Id.
110. 608 F. Supp. at 1463.
111. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that failure to provide emergency housing to
homeless families violated state and federal constitutional, statutory and regulatory
law. Id. Single homeless men in New York had obtained, through a consent decree
with the City and State of New York, the right to emergency housing. See Callahan v. Carey, No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. August 26, 1981). Homeless women in
New York have obtained that same right. See Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163,
459 N.Y.S. 2d 960 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 A.D.2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744
(App. Div. 1983).
112. Plaintiffs also asked the court for an injuction requiring the HRA "to provide lawful emergency housing to meet the needs of plaintiffs." Canaday, 608 F.
Supp. at 1463. This request was supported by three arguments. The first argument
rested on "the maze of federal and state statutes and regulations governing emergency aid to needy families with children." Id. The second and third arguments for
emergency housing were based on New York common law, article XVII, § 1 of the
New York State Constitution, and numerous provisions of the New York Social
Services Law. Id.
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the district court abstained from deciding the case, pending resolution of a parallel state action.'1 3 The state action, brought by fourteen named homeless plaintiffs, sought an injunction ordering
114
suitable emergency housing for homeless families and children.
While the Canaday court ultimately abstained on Colorado River
grounds,"X5 it also found that Burford warranted abstention.116
The Canaday court defined the Burford doctrine as a "brand
of abstention [which] permits federal courts to exercise their discretion to refrain from interfering with state policymaking and enforcement efforts in complex areas which are primarily of state
concern and prerogative." 17 In determining that Burford abstention applied, the district court considered the clarity of the state
law, the importance of the subject matter of the action to the state
or political subdivision, and the manner the state had chosen to
deal with the problem presented."s 8 The court then concluded
that the problem of New York City's homeless was one of
predominantly local concern, unsuited to federal remedy,"X9 which,
113. Id. at 1475.
114. See McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987).
For a discussion of the ultimate holding in McCain, see supra note 95.
115. For a discussion of Colorado River abstention and its application to litigation involving the homeless, see infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
116. Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1468-72.
117. Id. at 1468.
118. Id. at 1468-69.
119. Id. at 1470. Judge Leisure, the author of the Canaday district court opinion,
stated that:
This Court has no particular expertise in structuring welfare programs, or allocating scarce resources among competing needs. Nor is it
on familiar terms with the state and local political and procedural apparatus which could come under its receivership were it to proceed
with deciding this case. Nor does it have the familiarity with state law
that is indispensable to adequate decision of this wrenching problem.
For the federal court to thrust itself into this area and dictate to state
and local officials its view of the proper way to discharge their official
duties can hardly be conducive to harmonious federalism.
Id.
The author of this article, while recognizing the veracity of Judge Leisure's
dicta, disagrees with his viewpoint that federal courts are not the forum for resolving issues of homelessness. The federal courts have become involved in the administration of state programs and institutions, and have told state officials how to
discharge their duties. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.)
(state mental hospital), hearings on standardsordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part; rev'd in part sub. nom. and remanded, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (state prison),
aff'd and remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. after remand and
remanded, Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'd
sub nom. after remand, Finney v. Hutto, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S.
678 (1978). Although federal court involvement often requires ongoing judicial participation and supervision, as the extensive subsequent histories of the above cases
indicate, such judicial activism can be appropriate when the proper circumstances
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therefore, should be left in
sionmakers.120
3.

the hands of the

state deci-

Colorado River Abstention

The Supreme Court created a third abstention doctrine in
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States.121
There the Court decided for the first time that a federal court may
dismiss a claim within its subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is
being simultaneously litigated in state court.12 2 In Colorado River,
the United States sought a determination of its rights over certain
waters in one of the Colorado Water Divisions. 123 After the initiation of the federal suit, one of the water users named as a defendant brought an action in a Colorado state court. 12 4 Prior to
bringing its action in federal court, the United States also had filed
three actions in state court, seeking a determination of rights in
other waters of the Colorado Water Divisions.125 When some of
arise. The problems facing the homeless present a situation calling for such judicial
activism. The widespread incidence of homelessness stems from a myriad of social
problems. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text. The individual agencies
which should be assisting the homeless have been unable, acting alone, to eradicate
the problem. Thus, a comprehensive program must be established to aid the homeless. Given the general failure of the states to ameliorate the situation, federal
courts, acting in conjunction with Congress, should take the initiative to remedy
the problem of homelessness. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (federal court ordering racial desegregation of state school system despite existence of
complex state administration and inherent problems of federal court enforcement
and supervision), enforced, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Commentators on institutional litigation, in which courts are asked to oversee the operation of large public institutions, agree that federal judges should become involved in areas of complex state
administration, particularly if constitutional issues are at stake. See generally
Michael Combs, The Federal Judiciary and Northern School Desegregation:Judicial Management in Perspective, 13 J. L. & Educ. 345 (1984); Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen Yeazell, The Ordinaryand the Extraordinaryin InstitutionalLitigation,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1980); Fiss, supra note 7. These commentators point out that
remedying social ills is more important than the "harmonious federalism" that
Judge Leisure strives for.
120. Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1469. Judge Leisure further found that the federal
statutory bases of plaintiff's claims were intertwined with issues of state law.
Plaintiffs brought their action under Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-678 (1982). The Judge stated that as long as state officials
were complying with the mandatory conditions imposed by Congress, the federal
court should not "interject [itself] amidst the complications of state welfare administration unless expressly so directed by Congress." Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1472
(quoting Black v. Beame, 550 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977)).
121. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
122. Id. at 817-18.
123. Id. at 805. Under the Colorado Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 the State of Colorado is divided into seven water districts. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1974).
124. ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 806.
125. Id.
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the defendants in the federal action brought a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court, without
deciding the jurisdictional question, dismissed the federal action on
the grounds that the abstention doctrine required it to defer to
126
parallel state proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court, but the
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the district court's decision,
expressly creating a new abstention doctrine.127 This doctrine,
however, is not based on considerations of proper constitutional
adjudication and regard for federal-state relations, as are the Burford and Pullman abstention doctrines. 128 Rather, ColoradoRiver
is premised on the consideration of "wise judicial administration." 129 While recognizing the "virtually unflagging obligation of
the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them", 13 0 the
Court nevertheless found that when "exceptional circumstances"
exist, 13 1 dismissal of a federal action because of concurrent state
proceedings should be allowed.132
Although some lower courts have taken Colorado River at its
word and applied the doctrine narrowly,133 other courts have used
the exception to clear their dockets, abstaining on a mere showing
that an exercise of jurisdiction would be duplicative in light of a
state court action. 134 The inconsistent statements of the Supreme
126. Id.
127. Id. at 817.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 818. The Colorado River Court found that the following factors warrant the exercise of discretionary abstention in favor of concurrent state action:
state control over the res of the dispute; extreme inconvenience of the federal forum; avoidance of piecemeal litigation; and the state tribunal being the first to obtain jursdiction. Id.
The Court later seemed to broaden application of Colorado River abstention to
those cases merely involving the possibility of duplicative litigation. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). The Court
has since retreated from that position, however, and has reaffirmed Colorado River
abstention as "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it... [which] can be justified .. .
only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to
the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest." Moses
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
132. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
133. See, e.g., Turf Paradise Club, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.)
(refusing to abstain), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982); Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, 79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (refusing to abstain even though an
existing state court action was capable of resolving all issues presented).
134. See, e.g., Atchison v. Nelson, 460 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Wyo. 1978) (duplication
enough to warrant abstention); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (abstaining in favor of state court action which would adjudicate
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Court 3 5 regarding the application of Colorado River abstention

have left the lower courts in disarray as to the applicability of the
doctrine.
The result of the confusion can be seen in Judge Leisure's
opinion in Canaday. Judge Leisure, after considering Burford abstention,136 ultimately held that the case warranted Colorado
River abstention. 137 Leisure assessed the progress of the concurrent state litigation,13 8 whether resolution of the conflict would result in piecemeal litigation, the ability of the state court to give
complete and comprehensive relief, and the source of the law
which would resolve the dispute. 139 He found that all of these factors pointed to abstention. 140 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the decision.141
Examination of Canaday and Weiser 142 show how the Pullman, Burford and Colorado River abstention doctrines impose obstacles that hinder litigation efforts on behalf of the homeless.
While any plaintiff litigating an unresolved state issue in federal
court faces possible invocation of one of the abstention doctrines,
legal efforts on behalf of the homeless are particularly vulnerable
to delays in resolution. Because of the vast growth of the homeless
population in recent years, 43 and because clogged state courts are
unable to issue clear pronouncements of law, the issues facing the
homeless are more likely to be unresolved at the state level. Accordingly, without a message from the other branches of government, the federal judiciary could continue to use the abstention
doctrines to avoid deciding issues of homelessness. That message
may have been issued in the form of the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act.'"
the entire controversy); Private Medical Care Found., Inc. v. Califano, 451 F. Supp.

450 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (deference to state court proceedings in declaratory judgement action).

135. For a discussion of the changing Supreme Court policy on Colorado River
abstention, see supra note 131.
136. For a discussion of Burford abstention and its applicability to litigation involving the homeless, see supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
137. Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1475 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nonl Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
138. The concurrent state case was McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62,
517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987). See supra note 95 for a discussion of the holding in
McCain.

139. Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1473-75.
140. Id.
141. See Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
142. Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See supra notes 82-98
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Weiser decision.
143. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
144. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat.
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Using the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to
Circumvent Federal Abstention Doctrines

The enactment of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act ["Act"]145 may present an opportunity for the homeless
to evade the limitations imposed by the major federal abstention
doctrines. While not all litigation efforts on behalf of the homeless
which present issues of concurrent jurisdiction can avoid the application of abstention doctrines, careful utilization of various provisions of the Act may bring the homeless greater success in
obtaining a federal forum to adjudicate their rights.
A.

Circumventing Pullman Abstention

The Pullman doctrine allows a federal court to abstain from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction when an unsettled question
of state law exists, and resolution of the state law question might
moot the federal court's determination. 146 Currently only the constitutions of New York and Montana expressly provide for aid to
the needy.147 While the broad language in other state constitutions could give rise to rights for the homeless,148 no state's judicial system including New York's and Montana's has definitively
stated that its constitution requires the state to provide shelter for
its citizens.149 Thus, federal litigation involving the homeless'
right to shelter in any state will likely invoke the Pullman
doctrine.
Application of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act may be a way to avoid the invocation of Pullman abstention in
cases presenting the appropriate factors. Subtitle B of Title IV of
the Act allocates $100,000,000 for fiscal year 1987, and $120,000,000
for fiscal year 1988 for the implementation of an emergency shelter program for the homeless.150 Under the terms of the statute,
the allocated funds may be used to renovate, rehabilitate, or con482 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of titles 7, 20, 29, 40 and 42 U.S.C.A. (West
Supp. 1988)).

145. Id.
146. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). See
supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pullman abstention.

147. See N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1; Mont. Const. art XII § 3(3).
148. See Langdon & Kass, supra note 3, at 362-90 for an examination of the constitutions and relevant state statutes of the fifty states.
149. See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1987) (court refused to address the issue of whether New York State Constitution
affords a right to shelter to homeless citizens). See supra note 95 for a discussion of
the McCain holding.
150. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11377 (West Supp. 1988). Metropolitan cities, urban counties and states (for distribution to local governments) are eligible to receive the
funds available. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11 3 73(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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vert buildings for emergency shelter, to provide essential services
(including employment, health, drug abuse and education services), or for maintenance operations (other than staffing), insurance, utilities, and furnishings for the shelters.151 No state
recipient under Subtitle B of Title IV may receive any funds unless it "supplement[s] the assistance provided under this subtitle
with an equal amount of funds from sources other than this
2
subtitle."15
Those seeking access to federal courts could argue that the
states or municipalities which accept these federal funds no longer
have an unclear question of state law regarding services for the
homeless. Having accepted the federal funds specifically to provide shelter, and having provided matching monies out of their
own coffers, the participating states or municipalities have explicitly acknowledged their obligation to provide shelter for the homeless. If this argument is accepted, then Pullman abstention cannot
be invoked by federal courts sitting in those states, and one means
of denying the homeless a federal forum has been overcome.
A recent case from the Southern District of New York may
support the proposition that the Act may be used to circumvent
Pullman abstention. In Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol,15s which involved the educational rights of a homeless school child, 154 the district court looked to the Act for guidance as to what constitutes
residency.15 5 In a decision prior to the Orozco case, 156 the Second
Circuit had invoked Pullman abstention because it found that the
question of state residency requirements was unresolved under
New York law. The eagerness of the Orozco court to look at provisions of the Act to determine residency suggests that the Act may
be the authority to which courts can turn to avoid invoking Pullman abstention.
151. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11374(a) (West Supp. 1988). The funds allocated under the
Act for these supportive services can be used only if (1) such services have not been
provided by the local government during any part of the immediately preceding 12
month period, and (2) not more than 15 percent of the total amount used by the
locality is expended on such services. Id.
152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11375(a) (West Supp. 1988).
153. 674 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
154. The plaintiff in the case was a school aged child whose primary residence
was in a welfare hotel in Yonkers, New York. Id. at 126.
155. Id. at 126 n. 1. The court referred to a section of the Act which defines a
homeless individual as "an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is
a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary
living accommodations." Pub. L. No. 100-77, § 103(a), 101 Stat. 482, 485 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11302(a) (West. Supp. 1988)). The court found the district
where the welfare hotel was located to be the school district responsible for educating the homeless child. Orozco, 674 F. Supp. at 126.
156. Catlin v. Ambach, 820 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Bypassing Burford Abstention

The Burford doctrine advocates abstention when assumption
of federal jurisdiction would interfere with state administrative
proceedings.157 Burford abstention could be applied in those states
which have specific administrative agencies in place to deal with
the homeless, or whose administrative agencies provide "requisite
social services" whose benefits impact the lives of the homeless.158
In order to receive funds under Title 111159 of the Act, 160
however, states and cities must establish a local board to determine how program funds will be allocated.161 These local boards
are unlike other federally funded state agencies. 162 Other agencies
generally are given almost free reign in the determination of
which emergency programs will receive funding. 6 3 Conversely,
the local boards created under the Act, working under the supervision of the Emergency Food and Shelter National Board ("National Board"),64 may only use the funds allocated for limited and
specific purposes. 6 5 While prior legislation allocating federal
funds to state agencies adopted a "hands-off" policy of allowing
157. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 (1943). For a discussion of the
Burford abstention doctrine, see supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.), qff d sub nom Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985). States are free, absent more restrictive language, to determine the emergencies, and establish the programs on which
they spend funds received from the federal government for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and Emergency Assistance. Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1472 (citing Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 140 (1982)).
159. Title III is the Federal Emergency Management Food and Shelter Program.
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, §§ 301-321, 101
Stat. 482, 489-93 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11331-11351 (West Supp. 1988)).
160. Congress has allocated $15,000,000 for fiscal year 1987 and $124,000,000 for
fiscal year 1988 to carry out Title III. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11352 (West Supp. 1988).
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11332 (West Supp. 1988). The board is to be composed of the
mayor or other appropriate heads of government and local members of the United
Way of America, the Salvation Army, the National Council of Churches of Christ
in the U.S.A., Catholic Charities U.S.A., the Council of Jewish Federations, Inc.,
and the American Red Cross. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11331(b) (West Supp. 1988).
162. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (Supp. III 1985) (outlining broad requirements
applicable to state agencies administering Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) programs).
163. See id. State AFDC agencies "have considerable latitude in allocating their
AFDC resources." New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414
(1973).
164. Title III establishes the National board and specifies that its duties include
supervision and support of the local boards. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11331-11346 (West
Supp. 1988).
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11343 (West Supp. 1988). Under the direct supervision of the
National Board, local boards must use their allocated funds to supplement efforts
to provide shelter, food, and supportive services for homeless individuals, facilitate
access for homeless individuals to other services and benefits, and conduct minimum rehabilitation of existing shelter or feeding facilities. Id.
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the states to determine how best the funds are to be distributed
and the agencies are to operate, 166 the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act evinces a congressional purpose beyond
the mere provision of monetary assistance to the states. The local
boards created under the Act are not autonomous state agencies,
but rather a necessary extension of the National Board established
to implement the provisions of the Act.
Additionally, the Act amended Title V of the Public Health
Service Act, thus imposing further federal supervision of state
agencies which benefit the homeless and establishing a block grant
program under Subtitle B of Title VI for services to homeless individuals with chronic mental illness.167 Under this new program,
no state is eligible to receive any funds allocated for fiscal year
1987 or 1988168 unless it agrees that the funds will be used for providing community mental health services to homeless individuals
who exhibit a chronic condition of mental illness.169 Further, the
state has to agree that the projects and services receiving amounts
under Title VI of the Act will provide the following for the benefit
of the homeless persons covered by the Act: (a) outreach services
to both the chronically mentally ill homeless, or to those facing a
significant probability of becoming homeless; (b) diagnostic, crisis
intervention, habilitation, rehabilitation, and community mental
health services for the above described persons; (c) training for individuals who provide the above services; (d) referral services to
appropriate medical and hospital facilities; (e) supportive and supervisory services to homeless individuals in certain residential
settings; and (f) appropriate case management services. 170 Moreover, a state cannot receive funding unless it agrees that the monies received will not be used either to provide in-patient services,
to make cash payments to the recipients of mental health services,
to purchase or improve real property, to purchase major medical
equipment, or to satisfy any requirement for the expenditure of
166. States receiving monies for AFDC and Emergency Assistance are to retain
meaningful fiscal and programmatic control. Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 746
(1978).
167. See Pub. L. No. 100-77, § 611, 101 Stat. 482, 526 (1987) (amending 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 290 (1982)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 290cc-21 to 290cc-36, 290dd to
290dd-3, 290ee to 290ee-3 (West Supp. 1988)).
168. 42 U.S.C.A. § 290cc-35 (West Supp. 1988) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 290
(1982)).
169. 42 U.S.C.A. § 290cc-21(b) (West Supp. 1988) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 290
(1982)).
170. 42 U.S.C.A. § 290cc-24 (West Supp. 1988) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 290
(1982)).
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non-federal funds.171 By thus limiting the autonomy and decision
making capabilities of the state agencies receiving federal funding
under Title VI, Congress has eliminated the triggering factor of
Burford abstention. 172 A state receiving money under Title VI
will not be fulfilling a state administrative procedure, but, instead,
will be carrying out a federal one.
Thus, Burford abstention is inappropriate when the states
and cities involved are receiving funds under Title III and Title VI
of the Act. Administration of the agencies serving the homeless is
no longer solely delegated to the state. Instead, Congress expressely intended that administration of the funds under Title III and
Title VI bear the stamp of direct federal supervision. Accordingly,
the Act can be used to avoid Burford abstention and further the
rights of the homeless.
C

Avoiding Colorado River Abstention

Situations involving the use of the Colorado River abstention
doctrine usually arise in one of three ways: when a plaintiff concurrently files both a state and federal action; when a state court
defendant asserts a defense which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts; or when a state court defendant files a
"reactive" federal suit.' 73 Using the Act in situations involving
Colorado River abstention will most likely be unsuccessful, because the doctrine is premised on judicial efficiency, rather than
federalism concerns. 74 Accordingly, any federal action on behalf
of the homeless which is also pending in state court faces the prospect of being dismissed or stayed because of Colorado River
75
abstention.1
Nonetheless, by using the Act as a vehicle to make changes in
existing law, Congress provided a new area of federal questions.
Now that the homeless specifically are referenced, and federal legislation designates new services to provide for their needs, there is
an increasing likelihood that federal courts will be faced with actions involving the homeless. While this alone is not a basis for re171. 42 U.S.C.A. § 290cc-25 (West Supp. 1988) (amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 290
(1982)).
172. For a discussion of Burford abstention, see supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
173. Sonenshein, supra note 53, at 664.
174. For a discussion of judicial efficiency as a rationale for ColoradoRiver abstention, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.) (action stayed because of contemporaneous state court proceeding), aff'd sub nom. Cannady v. Valentin, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the holding in Canaday, see
supra notes 109-20, 137-40 and accompanying text.
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fusing to invoke ColoradoRiver abstention, it does present a policy
question for judges considering abdicating their given jurisdiction.
Given the narrowness with which the doctrine is supposed to be
applied, those judges must ask themselves whether abstaining
from an action presenting a clear federal question effectuates the
purpose of the Stewart B. McKinny Homeless Assistance Act. If
judges truly explore the purpose of the Act they will find that the
invocation of Colorado River abstention, as well as the Pullman
and Burford doctrines in cases involving the homeless thwarts
Congressional intent and deprives us all of a possible resolution of
a national problem.
IV.

Conclusion

Homelessness is a national problem effecting an ever-increasing variety of people. The issues involved in homelessness contain
questions that touch upon many areas of social and constitutional
policy, thus demanding resolution from the federal courts. Nevertheless, resolution has been hindered because federal judges,
working under the existing abstention doctrines, have abdicated
their given jurisdiction.
The recent enactment of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, by changing existing law and creating new, federally administrated programs, presents a means for homeless plaintiffs and federal judges to circumvent the abstention doctrines and
adjudicate issues of homelessness.

